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Abstract 
The main aim of this study was to estimate the demand for unregistered alcohol 
in Sweden 2001-2016 and to provide understanding on the determinants of 
demand for unregistered alcohol. The method used was a multiple linear OLS 
regression with fixed annual and regional effects. It was found that the relative 
share of the unregistered market 
A. correlates positively to prices on spirits;
B. correlates negatively to Danish excise duties on wine;
C. correlates positively to a net income increase; and,
D. is dependent on the proximity to the Danish border.
Conclusively, the unregistered market gives rise to various external effects; why 
it is recommended to review the price setting system of Systembolaget, 
alternatively, to harmonize European alcohol policies. 
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Abbreviations 
UM = Unregistered market (of alcohol) 
SM = Smuggle market (of alcohol) 
UMMS = Unregistered market minus smuggle market (of alcohol) 
AB = Alcoholic beverage 
SB = Systembolaget 
RNI = Regional net income (in Sweden) 
DED = Danish excise duties (on alcohol) 
PDB = Proximity to the Danish border 
CAN = The Swedish Council for Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs 
(Centralförbundet för narkotika- och alkoholupplysning) 
SCB = Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån) 
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1. Introduction
Sweden is known to be one of the few countries in the world that has regulated 
the alcohol market by only allowing one retailer domestically. Before entering 
the European Union (EU) in 1995, market regulations made it easier for the 
government to adjust the market, and importing alcoholic beverages was 
relatively restricted. For a few years, after entering the EU, some dispensation 
quotas were allowed for Sweden and other countries with similar alcohol policies. 
According to Folkhälsomyndigheten (2015) and Arnberg & Lord (2009), these 
quotas ended in 2004, due to strong pressure from the EU. 
As a politically sanctioned governmental constitution, the monopoly 
Systembolaget (SB), is used as means to lower the consumption of alcohol. If 
alcoholic beverages are easily purchased on the unregistered market (hereby 
“UM”), this could be seen as a failure of the monopoly. Kühlhorn (2000) showed 
that the UM, as a share of the total consumption of alcohol, generally has grown 
since entering the EU. Also, there is evidence that consumers, since entering the 
EU, have become more sensitive to price changes in SB, as described by 
Mihauscu & Hortlund (2015). According to the same authors (cf. Asplund et al., 
2005; Grittner & Bloomfield, 2009; Gustafsson, 2010), the most important factor 
seems to be relatively lower prices in the neighboring countries. This implies that 
the pricing regime of SB has a substantial impact on the UM. No research has 
been done to cover more exactly how the prices on SB affect the demand on the 
UM. 
Prices on SB are set through a price model which consists of four mark-ups: 
A. a general percentage charge regardless of the type of alcoholic beverages,
(administrative mark-up), and
B. a second fixed extra charge depending on the type of beverage.
C. An excise duty (alcohol duty) is added which also depends on the type
and the volume of the alcoholic beverage, ranging from beers/ciders that
have the lowest duty; to spirits, which carry the largest levy. This alcohol
duty does not depend on the price, it is fixed and does not depend on the
parameters above. E.g., in 2018, the excise duty on spirits was roughly
145 SEK per bottle .1
D. A VAT (Value Added Tax) of 25 percent is added on the final price (for
more details, see Systembolaget, 2018).
SB could be regarded as a price setter, considering the fact of the monopolistic 
power. But given their pricing model, the price can be estimated by the supplier 
1 The excise duty on spirits was calculated from the following information on Skatteverket: 
https://www.skatteverket.se/foretagochorganisationer/skatter/punktskatter/alkoholskatt/skattesat
ser.4.4a47257e143e26725aecb5.html 
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and therefore be adjusted to the customers’ willingness to pay, therefore making 
it possible to maximize profit within an interval of the demand function. For 
example, in 2014, when the excise taxation was increased on all alcoholic 
beverage types, the suppliers chose to lower the price, resulting in a zero net-
change for many products. In some extremes, a price reduction was reported, as 
Holm (2016) stated in an Expressen article. 
SB does not only use higher pricing to minimize consumption. Higher age limit 
(20) to purchase alcohol, few retail venues (compared to grocery stores), a
conservative approach to opening hours and many closed days are a few examples
of measures to meet their goal.
Asplund et al. (2007) have pointed out the relationship between distance to the 
Danish border and cross-border shopping. Having a less restricted market with 
limited monopolistic power, the prices in Denmark are lower. This leads to an 
easily accessible market abroad, which limits the impact of SB – particularly in 
regions close to the Danish border, which conclusively was shown by Norström 
(2005). The author discovered that the price elasticities of alcohol were higher in 
the south after entering the EU, meaning the consumers are more sensitive for 
price changes. The UM is, as described by Guttormsson et al. (2017), divided into 
four subcategories: the smuggle market (hereby abbreviated SM), non-
commercial imports, illegally distilled alcohol, and, lastly, Internet purchases. 
A growing SM is in and of itself a societal issue, resulting in higher criminality 
rates and is associated with larger costs for the government in form of judicial, 
police related and other similar costs. See, for instance, Dubourg & Prichard 
(2008), which concluded that organized crime involving excise goods (oils, 
tobacco and alcohol) costs 3.7 billion British pounds in Great Britain annually -- 
primarily through the loss of tax revenue. Considering all the factors of the price-
setting model, we believe that additional parameters should be considered when 
setting the price of alcoholic beverages. Based on microeconomic theory, any 
regulation or tax with the purpose of increasing the price in relation to the optimal 
quantity demanded on the market might result in a market-entry for SM suppliers. 
The main aim of this study is to estimate the demand for unregistered alcohol in 
Sweden and provide understanding on the determinants of demand for 
unregistered alcohol, with respect to prices of SB, Danish excise duties (“DED”), 
regional net income (“RNI”) and proximity to the Danish border (“PDB”). A 
semi-log (explanatory variable) multiple OLS regression with fixed annual and 
regional effects will be utilized to attain the objective. More broadly, this study 
could be beneficial for policy makers as a rough estimate of how the UM 
dynamics work. For instance, to see how an increased excise duty with the 
intention of increasing the prices on alcohol affects the demand on the UM, could 
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possibly raise awareness of non-intended external effects from such an 
intervention. That is, increased criminality rates or loss of tax revenue, as shown 
by Dubourg & Pritchard (2008) and Ferris (2000). A main focus of this study is, 
therefore, whether the registered alcohol prices variables affect the 
aforementioned markets. This because alcohol prices could easily be affected by 
policies (especially in the case of Sweden), compared to other variables of 
analysis.  
Also, the UM minus SM, hereby abbreviated “UMMS”, will be researched. The 
purpose of doing so is to detect whether there are different dynamics determining 
the demand between them. For instance, Asplund et al. (2007) found that the 
demand for cross-border shopping varies strongly on the proximity to the Danish 
border, which justifies the approach of dividing the alcohol demand with respect 
to hypothesized market characteristics and regional factors. 
We primarily aim to answer the following two questions: 
• Does the pricing on SB affect the demanded quantity on the UM of
alcohol?
• Does the pricing on SB affect the demanded quantity on the SM of
alcohol?
And these are the research hypotheses: 
A. Prices of alcohol abroad are positively related to the quantity demanded
on the domestic market. The lower foreign price, the lower domestic
demand. This supposition is supported by Asplund et al (2007), Grittner
& Bloomfield (2009) and Norström (2005).
B. Unregistered alcohol is a normal good, which means that the demand for
alcohol is positively related to an increase in income. This is supported by
Grittner & Bloomfield (2009).
C. There is a substitution effect between alcoholic products on the registered
market in regard to the UM. See, for instance, Norström (2005) who found
higher alcohol price elasticities after entering the EU. And last,
D. similar dynamics will be found to Asplund et al. (2007) regarding
fluctuations in demand on the UMMS and SM, depending on distance to
the Danish border.
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2. Theoretical background
2.1. The microeconomic assumptions 
For an account of economic theory relevant to this study, see Perloff (2017). 
There are a few vital theoretical assumptions that need to be made to make 
economic theory feasible. A paramount concept is rationality – the assumption 
that economic actors behave rationally; that is, they maximize utility or profit 
under all given circumstances. From this assumption, further inferences follow.  
1. The transitive relation of good bundles is an assumption that follows from
the idea of rationality: if good bundle A is better than B, and B is better
than C, it must also imply that A > C. The consumer is, in other words,
able to grade each good bundle with respect to the expected utility.
2. A consumer will always maximize her utility. Since utility is a personal
experience by nature, the concept is inherently complex to account for.
Usually, a proxy for utility is used instead: the willingness to pay. That is;
the more utility (or benefit) a consumer reaps from a purchase, the more
she is expected to pay for a certain good.
Another assumption is that of perfect information. All customers and businesses 
are assumed to possess knowledge of everything that may be of importance for 
an economic decision. Please note that not all assumptions of microeconomic 
theory are declared above. There are more concepts of importance, however, we 
deem the ones mentioned above the most relevant, given the purpose to analyze 
specifically consumer behavior -- that is, to derive a demand function.  
2.2. Economic concepts 
2.2.1. Supply and demand 
The model of linear supply and demand is one of the basic tools for economic 
analysis and the kind of model that will be used for this study. Supply is the 
aggregate of producers’ marginal cost to produce an additional good. Demand is 
the aggregate of consumers and the respective amount they are willing to pay for 
the supplied good. It is assumed that the demand function is negatively related to 
the price level – that is, the higher the price, the lower the demand. The supply 
function is instead positively correlated to the price level. These functions are, 
hence, predicted to have an intersection, called the equilibrium. This equilibrium 
could be offset by a market-interfering policy. For instance, such as the 
sanctioned monopoly presented in this paper. Political interventions generally 
give rise to welfare-losses. If the intervention also causes unwanted side-effects, 
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this is called an external effect, which is displayed below. In this study, the aim 
is to estimate a demand function. This is a generic demand function: 
𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 𝑐𝑐 −  𝑃𝑃0 −  (… ) 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 ± 𝑋𝑋0 ± (… ) 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 (Equation 1) 
Denotations: Q = quantity demanded. c = Constant/intercept, P = Price, X = Facultative variable. 
(Figure 1) 
2.2.2. Elasticities 
An elasticity is the derivative form of a demand coefficient which, for instance, 
measures how much the percental demanded quantity changes, if the own price 
(𝜀𝜀) – or income (𝜂𝜂) – level increases with one percent. This concept is useful 
when analyzing sensitivity in demand. The demand can either be elastic ( 𝜀𝜀 >
−1, or 𝜂𝜂 > 1), inelastic ( 𝜀𝜀 < −1, or  𝜂𝜂 < 1), or unit elastic ( 𝜀𝜀 = −1, or  𝜂𝜂 = 1). 
The elasticity measure answers the question how much a 1% own price (or 
income) increase/decrease affects the demanded quantity. In this study, the 
alcohol prices, Danish excise duties and regional net incomes will be logged to 
attain an interpretation similar to an elasticity. Mathematically: 
 𝜀𝜀 = −𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
× 𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕
   (Equation 2) 
𝜂𝜂 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
× 𝑞𝑞
𝜕𝜕
 (Equation 3) 
Denotations: 𝜀𝜀 = own price elasticity. 𝜂𝜂 = income elasticity. P = price. q = quantity. 
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2.3. Earlier research 
Alcohol markets is a fairly well-researched economic field, and many studies 
have been made to measure the elasticities on the market, see e.g. Gallet’s (2007) 
meta-study on the income effects and elasticities on alcoholic beverages. It is an 
attempt to gather a large sample of earlier, international, elasticity studies and 
find an average result. It was found that the income elasticity for alcohol, on 
average, in the studies are .690. Grittner & Bloomfield (2008), on the other hand, 
found a strong correlation between higher income and propensity to do cross-
border shopping. High income was associated with a 16% increased propensity 
to do alcohol imports. The authors did not conclude on an income elasticity; 
however, it is reasonable to assume that the UM of alcohol relates differently to 
income level than alcohol consumption in general. 
Norström (2005) conducted a study on the Swedish alcohol elasticities 1984-
2004. The author only found a significant change in the own price elasticity of 
wine when entering the EU (from -.62 to -.81). Mihaescu & Hortlund (2015) 
covered the own price elasticities of alcoholic beverages between the years 2006-
2013. They discovered a significant increase in all three beverage types (–1.36 
for spirits, –1.64 for wine and –1.02 for beers). They, analogically with Asplund 
et al (2007), mean that this increase is mainly due to less restrictive trading and 
importing environments, which effectively lead to more price sensitive 
consumers. 
Asplund et al. (2007) and Grittner & Bloomfield (2008) made attempts to find a 
correlation between the distance to the Danish border and Swedish domestic 
demand on cross-border alcohol imports. It was concluded that demand varies 
strongly with the distance, where distant regions (e.g. north Norrland) barely 
imported any alcohol. They argue that the differences in consumption arise from 
increasing transaction costs as the distance to the border grows. This will also be 
a paramount model of explanation in this study. Even though all beverage types 
are imported, independently of distance, Trolldal (2005) found that spirits are 
most commonly imported. Conclusively, this means one expects to find the 
largest coefficient for prices of spirits, compared to beers and wines, in this study. 
When entering the EU, the Swedish consumers suddenly had easier access to a 
larger alcohol market in continental Europe, where prices were (are) substantially 
lower. This caused a larger UM. On the other hand, as Room et al (2013) 
concluded, the overall alcohol consumption did not increase more than 
marginally. Instead, as they and Gustafsson (2010) claimed, there were no 
evidence of increased alcohol consumption in southern Sweden (e.g. Skåne) 
when Denmark cut excise taxation on alcohol (2003) and Sweden abolished the 
strict import quotas (2004). It is argued that consumers who already were going 
abroad for lower priced alcohol were the ones most affected by the policy 
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changes, i.e., the price sensitive consumer segment. If a positive relation between 
the prices of SB and the UM is found, this could make the case for a strategical 
domestic price abatement, since these findings could imply that merely the ratio 
between UM and the total consumption is affected. Potentially, this could also 
increase tax revenue, since according to Mihaescu & Hortlund (2015), the 
taxation level on spirits are possibly reaching “Laffer territory”, which means that 
additional taxation will reduce tax revenue. Or, as Lakhdar (2008) proposed 
regarding cross-border shopping of tobacco, a gradual harmonization of 
European excise goods policies could be a feasible solution to the UM complex 
of problems. Since the studies mentioned above discovered indices of an effect 
between the UM and prices of SB, this must be further investigated and 
depending on the results from the regression analysis, the feasibility of the above-
mentioned measures will be further discussed in Chapter 5.1. 
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 3. Method
3.1. Data Collection 
3.1.1. UM, SM and UMMS 
Data material and tables on the UM was collected from The Swedish Council for 
Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs (Centralförbundet för narkotika- och 
alkoholupplysning, commonly abbreviated “CAN”). The UM is defined as all 
alcohol that has not been sold through SB or institutions that serve spirits (e.g. 
bars, night clubs or restaurants). The largest part of the unregistered consumption 
is cross-border shopping (that is, duty free or purchases abroad intended for 
personal, domestic consumption), and the second largest is smuggled alcohol. 
There are also other, less common, forms of unregistered alcohol: Internet 
purchases and illegally distilled alcohol. These forms generally constitute less 
than 3% of the total consumption, whereas cross-border shopping, in some 
regions, constitutes up to 49% of the total consumption. From 2001 and onwards, 
CAN conducts annual surveys, monitoring the Swedish alcohol consumption 
behavior. For this study, data from the report Registrerad och oregistrerad 
alkohol i Sveriges län 2001-2016 by Guttormsson et al. is used (2017). 
The data on the unregistered consumption covers the mean total consumption of 
alcohol per capita, divided into regions. Here, it is assumed that what is supplied 
is consumed; that is, there is an equilibrium between demand and supply, since 
the SM and UM are estimated through the consumption. The depending variables 
are rendered as ratios of the total consumption. In the regression equation, the 
ratios are rendered as percent of the total consumption. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that by using ratios – and not total consumption in absolute terms – it will 
be complicated to derive predictions regarding individual alcohol consumption. 
Since the data is disaggregated, it was also possible to examine whether proximity 
to the Danish border would affect the consumption of unregistered alcohol, 
analogous to Asplund et al. (2007), while also achieving a denser set of data for 
the chosen years. The 21 Swedish counties are compiled into seven monitor 
regions as in Guttormsson et al. (2017): 
1. Skåne;
2. Blekinge, Kronoberg and Halland;
3. Västra Götaland;
4. Östergötland, Jönköping, Kalmar and Gotland;
5. Stockholm;
6. Uppsala, Södermanland, Värmland, Örebro, Västmanland, and Dalarna,
and finally;
7. Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten.
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From these monitor regions, region 1, 2 and 3 was selected as being in proximity 
to the Danish border. The interpretation of these dependent variables is in 
percentage points: a 1% change in a dependent variable leads to a certain 
percentage change in the UM/SM/UMMS.  Mathematical explanation: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (Equation 4) 
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 (Equation 5) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡−𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡  (Equation 6) 
Denotations: UMA, SMA = The absolute size of the UM/SM, measured in liters of pure alcohol per consumer and year 
in a specific region. TotC = The total consumption, measured in liters of pure alcohol per consumer and year in a specific 
region. r = Region. t = Time (year). 
3.1.2. Prices of Systembolaget 
Data on the mean price of alcoholic beverages for the years 2001-2016 (16 years 
in total) was used, which was given to us by a co-author of Registrerad och 
oregistrerad alkohol i Sveriges län 2001-2016, Björn Trolldal. The prices are 
differentiated into three categories with respect to beverage type: beer (where 
commercially retailed beer with an alcohol content of 3.5% or lower is excluded), 
wines and spirits. The price index has a base year (2016), and is denoted 100 (%), 
where other years of consideration will be measured as a percentage of the base 
year. For instance, the year 2001 is 111.13 for spirits, which means the price level 
of sprits are 11.13 percentage points higher than 2016 for that year. Since the 
prices of alcohol are set centrally, regional or local price differences are not an 
issue in this study. The time span of the indexes is mainly chosen due to the 
limitations of the annual report from CAN regarding Swedish alcohol 
consumption on a regional basis – the first of this kind was published 2001. 
The prices are adjusted with an inflation denominator. Otherwise there is a risk 
to find a positive gross price correlation. The used inflation data was the general 
CPI of Sweden for the years 2001-2016, where 2016 is the base year and denoted 
as 100 (%). For the sake of ease of interpretation, the index was logged. When 
logging a dataset, the interpretation will be in percent: a 1% change in prices 
(CPI) affects the UM/SM/UMMS by 𝛽𝛽0
100
 units, ceteris paribus. Mathematical 
explanation: 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1+𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� (Equation 7) 
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Denotations: P= real price on SB. Pp = nominal price on SB. j = index for spirits, beer or wine. i = inflation rate (CPI). t 
= time (year).   
3.1.3. Net regional income 
The net income is the income after taxes, plus transfer payments. It is measured 
as an average per capita and measured in SEK. This data was collected from 
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2018). Since the regression model will be based on 
regional data, the net income was also mapped out in accordance with the seven 
monitor regions (as were mentioned above) and measured per capita. As with the 
prices of the alcohol, the income was adjusted with the CPI inflation index with 
the base year 2016. Also, the index was logged with the natural logarithm to attain 
a normal distribution – and for the sake of easier, percentage, interpretation. 
When logging a dataset, the interpretation will be in per cent: a 1% change in RNI 
affects the UM/SM/UMMS by 𝛽𝛽0
100
  units, ceteris paribus. Mathematical 
explanation: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟.,𝑡𝑡1+𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 �  (Equation 8) 
Denotations: NRIn = nominal regional net income. i = inflation rate (CPI). r. = Region. t = time (year). 
3.1.4. Danish excise duties 
The excise duties of Denmark (DED) were collected from Eurostat (the European 
statistics agency) (2018). The values of each duty are described in the domestic 
currency (DKK, Danish crowns), and then converted to SEK by using historical 
conversion rate data from OFX (2018). The used conversion rates were the 
average of a year. The logged duties were converted to SEK, this to attain a 
normal distribution and for the sake of easier interpretation. The interpretation of 
these variables is in percent: a 1% increase in excise taxation on an alcoholic 
beverage affects UM/SM/UMMS by 𝛽𝛽0
100
  units, ceteris paribus. Mathematical 
explanation: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡)       (Equation 9) 
Denotations: DEDdkk = Danish excise duties in DKK. j = spirits, beer or wine. ConvR = Conversion rate (DKK to SEK) 
(annual mean).  t = time (year). 
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3.2. Statistical model 
3.2.1. The assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares 
The test that will be conducted is a semi-log, multivariable Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) analysis with fixed effects. The fixed effects will be achieved by 
using the dummy method (see below for further explanations).  
To obtain an accurate result from an OLS regression, there are some conditions 
of the data set which need to be fulfilled: 
1. Linearity in parameters. This means that the parameters (i.e., 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) cannot
follow a logarithmic or exponential pattern.
2. Mean error distribution should be zero. This means that the deviations of
the specific observations from the fitted regression line should summarize
to 0. This condition was reasonably well fulfilled, with standard errors of
the regressions (S) close to 0 and high R2 (coefficient of determination)
in all three regressions (see Chapter 4).
3. No multicollinearity. The predicting variables should not co-variate with
other predictors of the regression. This condition was not fulfilled by the
regressions, however, the causes of the high VIF (Variance Inflation
Factor) numbers will be addressed in the analysis section.
4. Homoscedasticity. There can be no autocorrelation in the error terms. This
usually occurs when using time panel data -- as in this case -- because the
error term of one year is most likely dependent on the previous year. No
way to compensate for eventual autocorrelations in this regression has
been found. This will be discussed below.
3.2.2. Limitations of the OLS 
As stated above -- a major drawback when utilizing an OLS regression for time-
dependent panel data is the condition of homoscedasticity. The homoscedasticity 
assumption is the assumption of independent observations across time. Since, for 
instance, the size of the UM most likely is dependent on the size of the previous 
year, these two observations are closely interlinked. By not fulfilling this 
criterion, the regression violates the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) 
condition, as established by Gauss-Markov. However, autocorrelation does not 
necessarily affect the coefficients of a regression. Rather, it is the standard errors 
which are likely to be underestimated; hence, also the p-values. 
Analogically to the autocorrelation issue at hand, there is also another drawback 
when utilizing OLS to predict time-series panel data. Since consumption, prices 
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and income all are associated with the level of the previous year, it cannot be 
predicted how fast a population adjusts to the new levels of, e.g., income. This 
becomes an issue, as the level of the dependent variable might not be associated 
with the predicting variable of the same year. An OLS cannot account for such 
time lags. This could be remedied by using robust standard errors. On the other 
hand, Norström (2005) pointed out that consumers adapt relatively quickly to new 
price levels, still making the approach of this study adequately feasible. Also, the 
analysis only covers a small interval of possible prices on the goods. It is dubious 
whether extrapolations of the results will make for adequate predictions since 
elasticities are prone to change as a dependent variable change, possibly resulting 
in a non-linear relationship. Considering the drawbacks of the chosen method, it 
is advised to interpret the results as mere signs of correlational direction, rather 
than the coefficients being accurate pinpoints. 
Another issue with OLS is causality. Even though significant results are found, it 
cannot surely be concluded that the variables measured have a causal relationship. 
For instance, a lurking – or mediating – variable could instead be a factor which 
affects both the independent and dependent variables.  
3.2.3. Dependent variables 
To cover as many aspects of the demand of unregistered alcohol as possible, a 
regression model with three responding variables was constructed: the total share 
of the unregistered alcohol market (UM), the smuggled alcohol as a share of the 
total market (SM), and finally, the unregistered market excluding the smuggled 
part as a share of the total market (UMMS). These are the dependent variables: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
3.2.4. Explanatory variables 
The predicting variables are divided into continuous predictors and indicator 
variables. The continuous predictors are those which can take on intervals of 
values (e.g., income can vary indefinitely) and are generally denoted 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 in the 
generic regression model. Indicator variables are categorical elements, which 
cannot possibly take on a numerical value (e.g., a region cannot be ascribed more 
than an arbitrary numerical value). These variables are instead ascribed either a 0 
or 1, analogous to “off” and “on”. These are the continuous predictors: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
Please note: the log is included in these variables for the sake of easier 
interpretation of the regression models – the variables are not double-logged. 
3.2.5. Indicator variables 
The indicator variables are dummies for the seven monitor regions, dummies for 
the studied years (2001-2016), a dummy for the event of ending the import quotas 
for alcohol, and lastly, a dummy for regions in close proximity to the Danish 
border. Including these dummies in the regression model creates fixed effects 
(FE). That is; most continuous predictors and response variables of the model are 
not to be arbitrarily correlated. Some predicting variables have an effect on other 
predictors (e.g. the year has an effect on net income and prices). Since this is 
assumed, a fixed effect model is necessary. Leaving this out causes omitted 
variable bias, where variables are arbitrarily coupled, where no consideration is 
taken for geographical or temporal conditions. These are the indicator variables 
of the regression: 
𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1…7 
𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 
𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 
Denotations: α = coefficient. Y = FE for years. PDB = Proximity to Danish border. Reg = Monitor regions 1-7.  
3.2.6. Test models 
Since there are many similar predictors among the fixed effect dummies, these 
generic models will aggregate the year and region predictors. This to make the 
models more appealing and comprehensible: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1…7 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 +
𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡                                               (Model 1) 
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1…7 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 +
𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡                                               (Model 2) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1…7 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 +
𝛼𝛼3𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡                                                (Model 3) 
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4. Results
The results will be presented in the following order: UM, SM and UMMS. For a 
complete account of the results and for summary statistics, please see Appendix 
1. Below is a summary table of the regressions:
   Table 1 (Summary statistics on regressions) 
UM 
R2 = 93.7% 
S (ε) = .0355265 
SM 
R2 = 74.84% 
S (ε) = .0209315 
UMMS 
R2 = 92.67% 
S (ε) = .0316366 
Constant (α) .2687*** 
(.0886) 
.0906* 
(.0520) 
.1781** 
(.0787) 
Price of Spirits (log) 3.82** 
(1.67) 
.860 
(.987) 
2.96** 
(1.49) 
Price of Beers (log) .66 
(2.14) 
0.24 
(1.26) 
.42 
(1.91) 
Price of Wines (log) -1.80
(2.54)
-.2 
(1.50) 
-1.60
(2.26)
DED on Spirits (log) -.0166 
(.0430) 
-.0241 
(.0253) 
.0075 
(.0383) 
DED on Beers (log) .0251 
(.179) 
.108 
(.105) 
.144 
(.159) 
DED on Wines (log) -.2167** 
(.0867) 
-.0469 
(.0511) 
-.1698** 
(.0772) 
RNI (log) .914*** 
(.301) 
.113 
(.177) 
.801*** 
(.268) 
PDB .0918*** 
(.0263) 
.0432*** 
(.0155) 
.0486** 
(.0767) 
*= Statistically significant on the 10% level. **= Statistically significant on the 5% level. ***= Statistically         
significant on the 1% level. Numbers without brackets are coefficients. Numbers with brackets are standard errors (SE).
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4.1. Unregistered market 
Table 2 (Regression on UM) 
Coefficient SE Coef P-value VIF 
Constant (𝛼𝛼0) .2687 .0883 .003 - 
Price of spirits (log) 3.82 1.64 .025 406.25 
Price of beer (log) .66 2.14 .759 685.75 
Price of wine (log) -1.80 2.54 .480 550.10 
RNI (log) .914 .301 .003 333.63 
DED on spirits (log) -0.0166 .0430 .700 58.28 
DED on beers (log) .251 .179 .163 2487.54 
DED on wine (log) -.2167 .0867 .014 96.40 
PDB .0918 .0263 .001 15.03 
An OLS regression was run to predict UM from prices of SB, RNI, DED and 
PDB. R2 = .937. Interpretation of the constant (𝛼𝛼0): the mean minimum share of 
the UM is .2687 of the total consumption (p = .003). With an α (significance 
level) = .05, the true intercept is within the interval .095632 to .441768 
(.2687±.0883×1.96). Only results below, or of, a 10% alpha will be interpreted. 
Parenthesis marks the correlation coefficient. 
4.1.1. Prices of Systembolaget 
The price of spirits statistically significantly predicted UM on the 5% level, p = 
.025 (3.82). Prices of beers and wines were not significant, p = .759 and p = .480, 
respectively.  Interpretation: a 1% increase in spirits prices on SB is predicted to 
increase the UM, as a share of the total consumption, with 3.82 
100
 units, which is the 
equivalent of 3.82%, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true coefficient is 
within the interval .6056 to 7.0344 (3.82±1.64×1.96). This result strengthens the 
hypothesis that a higher price on spirits cause consumers to seek cheaper 
substitutes on the UM. 
16 
4.1.2. Excise duties of Denmark 
The wine variable statistically significantly predicted the UM on the 5% level, p 
= .013 (-.2177). Interpretation: A 1% increase in Danish excise taxation on wine 
is predicted to decrease the demand on the UM with −.2167 
100
 units, which is the 
equivalent of -.2167%, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true coefficient is 
within the interval -.046768 to -.386632 (-.2167±.0867×1.96). This result 
strengthens the hypothesis that alcohol prices abroad have a negative relation to 
unregistered demand on the domestic market. 
4.1.3. Regional net income 
The RNI of Sweden statistically significantly predicted UM on the 1% level, p = 
.003 (.914). Interpretation: if the RNI rises with 1%, the UM is predicted to 
increase with .914
100
 units, which is the equivalent of .914%, ceteris paribus. With 
an α = .05, the true coefficient is within the interval .32404 to 1.50396 
(.914±.301×1.96). This result strengthens the hypothesis that alcohol on the UM 
is a normal good. 
4.1.4. Proximity to Danish border 
PDB statistically significantly predicted UM on the 1% level, p = .001 (.0918). 
Interpretation: It is predicted that the monitor regions in proximity to the Danish 
border are associated with an increased amount of unregistered alcohol 
consumption by 9.18 percentage points, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true 
coefficient is within the interval .040252 to .143348 (.0918±.0263×1.96). This 
strengthens the hypothesis that consumers in regions close to the Danish border 
are more prone to go to the UM. 
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4.2. Smuggle market 
             Table 3 (Regression on SM) 
Coefficient SE (Coefficient) P-value VIF 
Constant (𝛼𝛼0) .0906 .0520 .085 - 
Price on spirits (log) 0.860 0.987 .386 406.25 
Price on beer (log) .24 1.26 .851 685.75 
Price on wine (log) -.20 1.50 .895 550.10 
RNI (log) .113 .177 .525 333.63 
DED on spirits (log) -.0241 .0253 .344 58.28 
DED on beer (log) .108 .105 .309 2487.54 
DED on wine (log) -.0469 .0511 .361 96.4 
PDB .0432 .0155 .006 15.03 
A multiple regression was run to predict SM from prices of SB, RNI, DED and 
PDB. R2 = .7484. Interpretation of the constant (𝛼𝛼0): The mean minimum share 
of the SM is .0906 (9.06%) of the total consumption (p = .085). With an α = .05, 
the true intercept is within the interval -.01132 to .19252 (.0906±.0520×1.96). 
Only results below, or of, a 10% alpha will be interpreted below. Brackets mark 
the correlation coefficient. 
4.2.1. Prices of Systembolaget 
Prices of spirits, beers and wines were not significant, p = .378, p = .857, and 
.900, respectively. The variables failed to statistically significantly predict the 
SM. 
4.2.2. Excise duties of Denmark 
Danish excise duties on spirits, beers and wines were not significant, p = .343, p 
= .313 and p = .361, respectively. The variables failed to statistically significantly 
predict the SM. 
4.2.3. Regional net income 
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The regionally distributed net income of Sweden was not significant, p = .525. 
The variable failed to statistically significantly predict the SM. 
4.2.4. Proximity to Danish border 
PDB significantly predicted SM on the 1% level, p = .006 (.0432). Interpretation: 
It is predicted that monitor regions in proximity to the Danish border are 
associated with an increased amount of unregistered alcohol consumption by 4.32 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true coefficient is within 
the interval .01202 to .07358 (.0432±.0155×1.96). The standard error partly 
covers the same interval as the UMMS (see results below), therefore it cannot be 
assumed that the SM is less dependent on geographical situation. 
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4.3. Unregistered market minus smuggle market 
 Table 4 (Regression on UMMS) 
Coefficient SE Coefficient P-value VIF 
Constant (𝛼𝛼0) .1781 .0787 .026 - 
Price of spirits (log) 2.96 1.49 .05 406.25 
Price of beer (log) .42 1.91 .826 685.75 
Price of wine (log) -1.60 2.26 .480 550.10 
RNI (log) .801 .268 .004 333.63 
DED on spirits (log) .0075 .0383 .846 58.28 
DED on beer (log) .144 .159 .369 2487.54 
DED on wine (log) -.1698 .0772 .031 92.40 
PDB .0486 .0234 .041 15.03 
A multiple regression was run to predict UMMS from prices of SB, RNI, DED 
and PDB. R2 = .9267. Interpretation of the constant (𝛼𝛼0): The mean minimum 
share of the UMMS is .1781 (17.81%) of the total consumption (p = .025). With 
an α = .05, the true intercept is within the interval .023848 to .332352 
(.1781±.0787×1.96).  Only results below, or on, a 10% alpha will be interpreted. 
Parentheses mark the correlation coefficient. 
4.3.1. Prices of Systembolaget 
The price of spirits statistically significantly predicted UMMS on the 5% level, p 
= .05 (2.96). Prices of beers and wines were not significant, p = .759 and p = .480, 
respectively.  Interpretation: a 1% increase in spirits prices on SB is predicted to 
increase the UMMS, as a share of the total consumption, with 2.96 
100
 units, which is 
the equivalent of 2.96%, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true coefficient is 
within the interval .0396 to 5.8804 (2.96±1.49×1.96). This result strengthens the 
hypothesis that a higher price on spirits cause consumers to seek cheaper 
substitutes on the UMMS. 
4.3.2. Excise duties of Denmark 
The wine variable statistically significantly predicted the UMMS on the 5% level, 
p = .031 (-.1698). Interpretation: A 1% increase in Danish excise taxation on wine 
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is predicted to decrease the demand on the UMMS with −.1698 
100
 units, which is the 
equivalent of -.1698%, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the true coefficient is 
within the interval -.028288 to -.31492 (-.1698±.0722×1.96). This result 
strengthens the hypothesis that alcohol prices abroad have a negative relation to 
unregistered demand on the domestic market. 
4.3.3. Regional net income 
The RNI of Sweden statistically significantly predicted UMMS on the 1% level, 
p = .004 (.801). Interpretation: if the RNI rises with 1%, the UMMS is predicted 
to increase with .801
100
 units, which is the equivalent of .801%, ceteris paribus. With 
an α = .05, the true coefficient is within the interval .27572 to 1.32628 
(.801±.268×1.96). This result strengthens the hypothesis that alcohol on the 
UMMS is a normal good. 
4.3.4. Proximity to Danish border 
PDB statistically significantly predicted UMMS on the 5% level, p = .041 
(.0486). Interpretation: It is predicted that the monitor regions in proximity to the 
Danish border are associated with an increased amount of unregistered alcohol 
consumption by .0486 percentage points, ceteris paribus. With an α = .05, the 
true coefficient is within the interval .002736 to .094464 (.0486±.0234×1.96). 
This strengthens the hypothesis that consumers in regions close to the Danish 
border are more prone to go to the UMMS. 
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5. Discussion
5.1. Analysis 
While the objective of the study was to find a demand function for smuggled and 
unregistered alcohol, the main goal was to find to what extent the prices of SB 
affect the demand on these markets. We had the following hypotheses:  
A. Prices of alcohol abroad are positively related to the quantity demanded
on the domestic market.
B. Unregistered alcohol is a normal good, which means that the demand for
alcohol is positively related to an increase in income.
C. There is a substitution effect between alcoholic products on the registered
market with respect to the UM.
D. UMMS and SM depend similarly on proximity to the Danish border.
The results of the regressions seem to confirm that especially spirits prices are 
sensitive to consumers on the UM and UMMS. However, the prices of wines and 
beers proved statistically insignificant. Either this confirms that the share of the 
UM is not sensitive to changes in these prices, or it could also be explained by 
lower volatility in the studied time period. It could also be, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.2.2., due to poorly matched variables. We adhere to the former 
explanation, as Asplund et al (2007) and Mihaescu & Hortlund (2015) have found 
indices on increased own price elasticities for both wine and beer. Even though a 
poor proxy for the prices in Denmark was used in this study, significant results 
for the DED on wine was still found, which also, indeed, confirms their findings. 
The findings also seem to confirm both hypothesis C (for wine) and A (for spirits) 
on the UM and UMMS. The results of the SM with respect to the alcohol prices 
of SB were not significant. It is still reasonable to assume a correlation between 
these variables. In addition to low variability in pricing, we believe this can be 
explained by few observations for each county and year. Safer results could be 
achieved by using fewer regions to get more accurate predictions, at the expense 
of lower resolution results. 
RNI was clearly significant for both the UM and UMMS regression equations, 
and both correlations were positive. It is likely there are causal correlations 
between income and demand on the UM and UMMS as found by Grittner & 
Bloomfield (2008), and the results seem to confirm hypothesis B – that income 
is a likely parameter in unregistered alcohol consumption. 
We expected the SM to be dependent on geographical situation. This seems to be 
true and could possibly be explained by lower transaction costs for smugglers, or, 
perhaps, easier consumer access, analogous to the reasoning of Asplund et al 
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(2007) about the UMMS. This result seems to confirm hypothesis D. If the 
transaction costs are lower, it is reasonable to assume lower market prices, which 
presumably causes a higher demand on the goods in question. 
The results of the UMMS regression were somewhat unexpected. As explained 
above, this regression equation was used to see the difference in p-values and 
coefficients between the UM and itself, minus the smuggle share. It was expected 
that the p-values were higher for UMMS, compared to UM, especially for the 
income variable. This because of the generally high p-values of SM. This did not 
seem to be true; the correlations for alcohol, PDB, DED and RNI were all still 
similar to UM, though, all of the mentioned variables showed higher p-values and 
weaker correlations in the UMMS regression. Lower correlation coefficients 
could be due to the lower share of the UMMS, which – per definition (see Chapter 
3.1.1.) – must be smaller, or equal to, the UM. A possible explanation, and 
aggravating issue, when studying these markets separately is that the point 
estimates of alcohol consumption could be relatively inaccurate due to smaller 
sample sizes (as in the case of the SM). This likely resulted in more significant 
results on the aggregated UM. All in all, it seems the UMMS and SM are 
somewhat disparate phenomena. For further studies, we would recommend 
keeping these markets separated to find more adequate results. 
Lastly, the results consistently showed significantly high VIF numbers which 
indicate multicollinearity (A VIF over 10 indicates there is multicollinearity) – 
among the price variables, the DED and RNI. While it usually should be seen as 
a major drawback for the accuracy of a regression, we argue it could be explained 
by just looking at the variables included in the regressions. The prices of beers, 
spirits and wines are all depending on the same VAT and excise duties. Although, 
as explained earlier, different beverage types have different levels of excise 
taxation. Generally, excise duties for different beverages are imposed at the same 
time, which causes a temporal price correlation between the goods. This is also 
evident in the data tables – the prices generally follow a similar trend. By the 
same reasons as presented above, the VIF numbers of the Danish excise duties 
could also be explained. However, as the goal of the study merely was to find out 
the polarity of different variables, we would still recommend further investigation 
by using statistical methods which account better for multicollinearity. 
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5.2. Limitations 
Please note: Limitations of the chosen statistical method is discussed in Chapter 
3.2.2. 
5.2.1. Endogenous weaknesses 
There are some significant differences between the UM and the registered market. 
For instance, there are no perfect instruments to measure the size and impact of 
the former. The data collected for this study is based on the report Registrerad 
och oregistrerad alkohol i Sveriges län 2001-2016 by Guttormsson et al. 
(2017).  This report is the most complete record of the alcohol consumption of 
Sweden’s population, however, it has inherent issues. The authors note that it is 
hard to estimate the SM of the unregistered consumption, due to, among other 
factors, consumers’ proneness to under-report such behavior. Sometimes, it is 
also due to too few self-reports for counties with a small population. This leads 
to a wide, or hard-to-estimate, confidence interval which could effectively cause 
an inaccurate point estimation of the average consumption in a region. These 
estimations are fundamental to this study, which might cause lower degrees of 
statistical power (higher chances of type I and II errors) in the predictions of the 
demand models. A weakness of measuring the size of the UM as a ratio of total 
consumption is that the UM could seem to be changing, even though it is of a 
constant size, because of fluctuations in registered consumption.  
Another weakness of the data material is the excise duty tables that are used as 
predictors for the approximative alcohol pricing in Denmark. Excise duties do 
have an impact on the prices of alcoholic beverages, though, there are more 
factors determining the retailing price. These duties merely mirror the absolute 
value of the duty itself; not in combination with VAT, which causes distortions 
to the pricing proxy. That is, if the VAT on, e.g., beer, increases, the effective 
excise duty also increases. This is because the VAT is added on the retailing price 
of the beer, as explained earlier, where the excise duty is already included. Apart 
from that, the prices can also change from a retailer or producer perspective 
because of changes in prices of input products (e.g. wheat, barley or potatoes) or 
exogenous demand fluctuations. All in all, the excise duty proxy has some 
inherent issues, so it should primarily be regarded as a rather blunt approximate 
of foreign alcohol pricing. Preferably, proper price data would have been used for 
this study, but due to limited access to the DST’s (Danmarks Statistik, Denmark’s 
Statistics) statistical archives, this could not be achieved. 
The prices of SB are based on the mean percentage change of each alcoholic 
category of each year, which in turn is based on an inflation adjusted CPI 
(Consumer Price Index). This could become fallacious, or rather, a cause of an 
underestimation of the price sensitivity of the potential customers of the UM and 
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SM. There is, as mentioned in Chapter 2.3, evidence that Swedish customers 
turning to the UM are more price sensitive. Therefore, the closest substitute to 
the unregistered alcohol is cheap, registered such. This would not have been 
problematic if the taxation of alcohol worked analogically to other foodstuffs; 
lower priced alcohol is to a larger percentage part constituted by an excise duty. 
A change in this excise duty will, consequently, cause a bigger percental change 
in the price of cheap alcoholic beverages. 
5.2.2. Exogenous weaknesses 
A factor that may affect the results is changes in preferences, which are not the 
cause of a general decline or incline in consumption, such as people becoming 
increasingly risk-averse, causing consumers to avoid the SM for different 
reasons. Analogically to risk-aversion, risk seeking behavior – or 
implementations of judicial measures that aim to alter smugglers’ illegal behavior 
– is also a factor that is intricate to exclude or account for when measuring
fluctuations of the UM share. Theoretically, every new legislation or policiary
command must be attributed with a dummy variable. However, such variables
are not included in the analysis. Originally, a dummy marking the end of the
import quota (2004) was included, which had to be discarded due to too few
observations.
There are most likely many omitted variables which will not be accounted for in 
the demand function, which causes an omitted variable bias. This could be 
regarded as a limitation in the scope of this study. For instance, there are probably 
more prices than the Danish that affect the demand on the UM. Germany is a 
popular destination for alcohol imports, and the excise duties of the country was 
first included in the regression. Due to monolithic pricing during the studied time 
period, the variable had to be discarded. Also, when considering the SM, there 
are probably more factors which determine demand. Demographical variables, 
such as age composition, could be a feasible determinant to explain the SM. 
Bearing that in mind, as the results will show, all models showed rather high R2 
numbers: 93.7% for UM, 74.84% for SM, and 92.67% for UMMS. This implies 
the most important factors determining demand are still included. 
In the regression model, a dummy variable indicating proximity to the Danish 
border (PDB) is included. This is to find out whether consumers in counties 
bordering to Denmark more easily substitute the registered market with the UM 
or SM. However, Sweden is technically bordering several more countries 
(Norway, Finland, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia), 
which are not accounted for in this study. In Asplund et al. (2007), the authors 
noted occurrences of consumers in, for instance, Haparanda (a community 
located in the far north of Sweden), going to the Finnish market for alcohol. The 
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authors did, on the other hand, conclude that the cross-border shopping in the 
region is too small to be accounted for. Similarly, this study does not have enough 
data to cover such specific instances of cross-border shopping. Nevertheless, 
there are still other borders than the Danish that arguably have an effect on 
unregistered alcohol demand. Geographically, only the borders of Finland and 
Norway can be attributed a direct proximity to Sweden. With other countries there 
is an immense issue of attributing specific monitor regions to specific borders, 
more than through ferry routes. Suitably, most ferry routes to continental Europe 
are in southern Sweden, which means they will be accounted for in this study, 
with exception of Nynäshamn (which is located in the Stockholm region and is 
connected to continental Europe). 
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6. Concluding discussion
A quite strong association between SB’s pricing regime for spirits and the spirit 
demand on the UM was found. This could be regarded as a negative external 
effect arising from the governmentally sanctioned monopoly. Theoretically, this 
means that SB has to harmonize its prices to the European level to solve the issue 
of the UM. Practically, this does not necessarily need to be a required measure, 
since there are more factors at work determining demand on the UM (proximity 
to the Danish border, and income has been covered in this study). As stated above 
in the discussion, more accurate research needs to be done to find more exact 
correlations. For instance, a PLS (Partial Least Squares) analysis which accounts 
for multicollinearity; and autocorrelation among temporally dependent variables, 
by, e.g., utilizing a VAR (Vector Autoregression). 
The explicit goal of SB is to reduce alcohol consumption. It is reasonable to 
assume that a revenue-maximizing government has the goal to maximize duty 
revenue from alcohol sales, and at the same time reduce the consumption of 
alcohol (to decrease costs for, e.g., hospitalizations related to alcohol induced 
diseases). These goals could be contradictory at this point of spirits taxation (see 
Hortlund & Mihaescu, 2015), meaning, the government must make trade-offs 
when deciding upon a new alcohol policy. From this study it is complicated to 
derive an obvious conclusion whether the prices are too high or too low compared 
with the stated goals. However, the correlation seems to exist for spirits on the 
UM, while there was also weaker evidence confirming the same hypothesis when 
using the Danish excise duties for wine as a price proxy.  From the collected 
results we recommend that extra caution should be taken governmentally when 
deciding upon new excise duty regimes for spirits. As the consumption seems to 
be rather stable (see Room et al., 2013), increased taxes risk to push more 
consumers to the UM, effectively causing lower tax revenues and more 
unregistered alcohol to flow into Sweden. Also, in the long term, as Lakhtar 
(2008) suggested about tobacco policies, it could be feasible to address the UM 
issue by harmonizing European alcohol policies, however, this is an unlikely way 
to go, judging from the Swedish alcohol policy history. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Legend: 
Unreg_tot = UM 
Smug_tot = SM 
Unreg_minus = UMMS 
Spirits = Price on sprits 
Beer = Price on beers 
Wine = Price on wines 
Income = RNI 
dutysprit_dn = DED on spirits 
dutywine_dn = DED on wine 
dutybeer_dn = DED on beer 
dummy_[region] = monitor region 1-7 
dummy_[year] = year 2001-2016 
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Regression on unregistered market (as retrieved from Minitab) 
(Summary statistics on UM) 
ANOVA on UM DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
Regression 22 1,67147 0,075976 60,20 0,000 
Price on spirits (log) 1 0,00656 0,006561 5,20 0,025 
Price on beer (log) 1 0,00012 0,000119 0,09 0,759 
Price on wine (log) 1 0,00063 0,000634 0,50 0,480 
RNI (log) 1 0,01162 0,011620 9,21 0,003 
DED on spirits (log) 1 0,00019 0,000188 0,15 0,700 
DED on beer (log) 1 0,00250 0,002500 1,98 0,163 
DED on wine (log) 1 0,00788 0,007876 6,24 0,014 
PDB 1 0,01537 0,015374 12,18 0,001 
Error 89 0,11233 0,001262 
Total 111 1,78380 
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Regression Analysis: Unreg_tot versus Spirits; Beer; Wine; Income; 
dutysprit_dn; ...  
The following terms cannot be estimated and were removed: 
   dummy_vasterg; dummy_gavleborg; dummy_2010; dummy_2011; dummy_2012; 
dummy_2013; 
   dummy_2014; dummy_2015; dummy_2016 
Method 
Categorical predictor coding  (1; 0) 
Continuous predictor standardization 
Subtract the mean 
Predictor Mean 
Spirits 4,6339 
Beer 4,5676 
Wine 4,5794 
Income 5,2347 
dutysprit_dn  12,1274 
dutybeer_dn    5,5251 
dutywine_dn    8,5254 
Model Summary 
S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred)
0,0355265  93,70%     92,15%      90,08% 
Coded Coefficients 
Term Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value      VIF 
Constant 0,2687   0,0883     3,04    0,003 
Spirits 3,82     1,67     2,28    0,025   406,25 
Beer 0,66     2,14     0,31    0,759   685,75 
Wine -1,80     2,54    -0,71    0,480   550,10 
Income 0,914    0,301     3,03    0,003   333,63 
dutysprit_dn     -0,0166   0,0430 -0,39    0,700    58,28 
dutybeer_dn 0,251    0,179     1,41    0,163  2487,54 
dutywine_dn      -0,2167   0,0867 -2,50    0,014    96,40 
danish_border 
  1               0,0918   0,0263     3,49    0,001    15,03 
dummy_skane 
  1  0,1533   0,0132    11,58    0,000     1,90 
dummy_blekinge 
  1               0,1232   0,0137     9,02    0,000     2,03 
dummy_osterg 
  1               0,1519   0,0135    11,26    0,000     1,98 
dummy_stockholm 
  1              -0,2281   0,0834 -2,74    0,007    75,49 
dummy_uppsala 
  1               0,0388   0,0158     2,45    0,016     2,73 
dummy_2001 
  1               -0,396    0,347    -1,14    0,257   625,20 
dummy_2002 
  1               -0,468    0,378    -1,24    0,218   741,19 
dummy_2003 
  1               -0,420    0,372    -1,13    0,262   720,07 
dummy_2004 
  1               -0,348    0,342    -1,02    0,313   608,57 
dummy_2005 
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  1 0,180    0,188     0,96    0,339   183,19 
dummy_2006 
  1 0,138    0,201     0,69    0,494   209,63 
dummy_2007 
  1 0,111    0,191     0,58    0,563   189,81 
dummy_2008 
  1 0,1742   0,0638     2,73    0,008    21,17 
dummy_2009 
  1 0,1162   0,0760     1,53    0,130    30,04 
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Regression on smuggle market (as retrieved from Minitab) 
(Summary statistics on SM) 
ANOVA on SM DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
Regression 22 0,115993 0,005272 12,03 0,000 
Price on spirits 1 0,000333 0,000333 0,76 0,386 
Price on beer 1 0,000016 0,000016 0,04 0,851 
Price on wine 1 0,000008 0,000008 0,02 0,895 
RNI 1 0,000178 0,000178 0,41 0,525 
DED on spirits 1 0,000396 0,000396 0,90 0,344 
DED on beer 1 0,000459 0,000459 1,05 0,309 
DED on wine 1 0,000369 0,000369 0,84 0,361 
PDB 1 0,003405 0,003405 7,77 0,006 
Error 89 0,038993 0,000438 
Total 111 0,154986 
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Regression Analysis: Smug_tot versus Spirits; Beer; Wine; Income; 
dutysprit_dn; ...  
The following terms cannot be estimated and were removed: 
   dummy_vasterg; dummy_gavleborg; dummy_2010; dummy_2011; dummy_2012; 
dummy_2013; 
   dummy_2014; dummy_2015; dummy_2016 
Method 
Categorical predictor coding  (1; 0) 
Continuous predictor standardization 
Subtract the mean 
Predictor        Mean 
Spirits 4,6339 
Beer 4,5676 
Wine 4,5794 
Income 5,2347 
dutysprit_dn  12,1274 
dutybeer_dn    5,5251 
dutywine_dn    8,5254 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF    Adj SS    Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value
Regression 22  0,115993  0,005272    12,03    0,000 
  Spirits 1  0,000333  0,000333     0,76    0,386 
  Beer 1  0,000016  0,000016     0,04    0,851 
  Wine 1  0,000008  0,000008     0,02    0,895 
  Income     1  0,000178  0,000178     0,41    0,525 
  dutysprit_dn       1  0,000396  0,000396     0,90    0,344 
  dutybeer_dn 1  0,000459  0,000459     1,05    0,309 
  dutywine_dn 1  0,000369  0,000369     0,84    0,361 
  danish_border      1  0,003405  0,003405     7,77    0,006 
  dummy_skane 1  0,000439  0,000439     1,00    0,320 
  dummy_blekinge     1  0,000013  0,000013     0,03    0,863 
  dummy_osterg       1  0,028188  0,028188    64,34    0,000 
  dummy_stockholm    1  0,000174  0,000174     0,40    0,530 
  dummy_uppsala      1  0,005146  0,005146    11,75    0,001 
  dummy_2001 1  0,000756  0,000756     1,73    0,192 
  dummy_2002 1  0,000590  0,000590     1,35    0,249 
  dummy_2003 1  0,000502  0,000502     1,15    0,287 
  dummy_2004 1  0,000527  0,000527     1,20    0,276 
  dummy_2005 1  0,000080  0,000080     0,18    0,669 
  dummy_2006 1  0,000075  0,000075     0,17    0,681 
  dummy_2007 1  0,000056  0,000056     0,13    0,721 
  dummy_2008 1  0,000633  0,000633     1,45    0,232 
  dummy_2009 1  0,000292  0,000292     0,67    0,417 
Error 89  0,038993  0,000438 
Total 111  0,154986 
Model Summary 
S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred)
0,0209315  74,84%     68,62%      60,17% 
Coded Coefficients 
Term Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value      VIF 
Constant 0,0906   0,0520     1,74    0,085 
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Spirits 0,860    0,987     0,87    0,386   406,25 
Beer      0,24     1,26     0,19    0,851   685,75 
Wine -0,20     1,50    -0,13    0,895   550,10 
Income 0,113    0,177     0,64    0,525   333,63 
dutysprit_dn      -0,0241   0,0253 -0,95    0,344    58,28 
dutybeer_dn 0,108    0,105     1,02    0,309  2487,54 
dutywine_dn       -0,0469   0,0511 -0,92    0,361    96,40 
danish_border 
  1                0,0432   0,0155     2,79    0,006    15,03 
dummy_skane 
  1              -0,00780  0,00780 -1,00    0,320     1,90 
dummy_blekinge 
  1               0,00139  0,00805     0,17    0,863     2,03 
dummy_osterg 
  1               0,06377  0,00795     8,02    0,000     1,98 
dummy_stockholm 
  1               -0,0310   0,0491 -0,63    0,530    75,49 
dummy_uppsala 
  1               0,03200  0,00934     3,43    0,001     2,73 
dummy_2001 
  1                -0,268    0,204    -1,31    0,192   625,20 
dummy_2002 
  1                -0,258    0,222    -1,16    0,249   741,19 
dummy_2003 
  1                -0,235    0,219    -1,07    0,287   720,07 
dummy_2004 
  1                -0,221    0,202    -1,10    0,276   608,57 
dummy_2005 
  1                 0,047    0,111     0,43    0,669   183,19 
dummy_2006 
  1                 0,049    0,118     0,41    0,681   209,63 
dummy_2007 
  1                0,040    0,113     0,36    0,721   189,81 
dummy_2008 
  1                0,0452   0,0376     1,20    0,232    21,17 
dummy_2009 
  1 0,0365   0,0448     0,82    0,417    30,04 
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Regression on unregistered market minus smuggle market (as 
retrieved from Minitab) 
(Summary statistics on UMMS) 
ANOVA on UMMS DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
Regression 22 1,12609 0,051186 51,14 0,000 
Price on spirits (log) 1 0,00394 0,003939 3,94 0,050 
Price on beer (log) 1 0,00005 0,000048 0,05 0,826 
Price on wine (log) 1 0,00050 0,000503 0,50 0,480 
RNI (log) 1 0,00892 0,008920 8,91 0,004 
DED on spirits (log) 1 0,00004 0,000038 0,04 0,846 
DED on beer (log) 1 0,00082 0,000817 0,82 0,369 
DED on wine (log) 1 0,00484 0,004837 4,83 0,031 
PDB 1 0,00431 0,004308 4,30 0,041 
Error 89 0,08908 0,001001 
Total 111 1,21517 
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Regression Analysis: unreg_minus_ versus Spirits; Beer; Wine; 
Income; dutysprit_dn; ...  
The following terms cannot be estimated and were removed: 
   dummy_vasterg; dummy_gavleborg; dummy_2010; dummy_2011; dummy_2012; 
dummy_2013; 
   dummy_2014; dummy_2015; dummy_2016 
Method 
Categorical predictor coding  (1; 0) 
Continuous predictor standardization 
Subtract the mean 
Predictor Mean 
Spirits 4,6339 
Beer 4,5676 
Wine 4,5794 
Income 5,2347 
dutysprit_dn  12,1274 
dutybeer_dn    5,5251 
dutywine_dn    8,5254 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF   Adj SS    Adj MS  F-Value  P-Value
Regression 22  1,12609  0,051186    51,14    0,000 
  Spirits 1  0,00394  0,003939     3,94    0,050 
  Beer 1  0,00005  0,000048     0,05    0,826 
  Wine 1  0,00050  0,000503     0,50    0,480 
  Income    1  0,00892  0,008920     8,91    0,004 
  dutysprit_dn       1  0,00004  0,000038     0,04    0,846 
  dutybeer_dn 1  0,00082  0,000817     0,82    0,369 
  dutywine_dn 1  0,00484  0,004837     4,83    0,031 
  danish_border      1  0,00431  0,004308     4,30    0,041 
  dummy_skane 1  0,18695  0,186947   186,78    0,000 
  dummy_blekinge     1  0,10030  0,100299   100,21    0,000 
  dummy_osterg       1  0,05384  0,053844    53,80    0,000 
  dummy_stockholm    1  0,00706  0,007063     7,06    0,009 
  dummy_uppsala      1  0,00023  0,000234     0,23    0,630 
  dummy_2001 1  0,00017  0,000170     0,17    0,681 
  dummy_2002 1  0,00039  0,000389     0,39    0,534 
  dummy_2003 1  0,00031  0,000314     0,31    0,577 
  dummy_2004 1  0,00017  0,000172     0,17    0,679 
  dummy_2005 1  0,00063  0,000633     0,63    0,429 
  dummy_2006 1  0,00025  0,000249     0,25    0,619 
  dummy_2007 1  0,00017  0,000172     0,17    0,679 
  dummy_2008 1  0,00515  0,005153     5,15    0,026 
  dummy_2009 1  0,00139  0,001386     1,38    0,242 
Error 89  0,08908  0,001001 
Total 111  1,21517 
Model Summary 
S    R-sq  R-sq(adj)  R-sq(pred)
0,0316366  92,67%     90,86%      88,38% 
Coded Coefficients 
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Term Coef  SE Coef  T-Value  P-Value      VIF 
Constant 0,1781   0,0787     2,26    0,026 
Spirits 2,96     1,49     1,98    0,050   406,25 
Beer 0,42     1,91     0,22    0,826   685,75 
Wine -1,60     2,26    -0,71    0,480   550,10 
Income 0,801    0,268     2,99    0,004   333,63 
dutysprit_dn      0,0075   0,0383     0,19    0,846    58,28 
dutybeer_dn 0,144    0,159     0,90    0,369  2487,54 
dutywine_dn      -0,1698   0,0772 -2,20    0,031    96,40 
danish_border 
  1               0,0486   0,0234     2,07    0,041    15,03 
dummy_skane 
  1               0,1611   0,0118    13,67    0,000     1,90 
dummy_blekinge 
  1               0,1218   0,0122    10,01    0,000     2,03 
dummy_osterg 
  1               0,0881   0,0120     7,33    0,000     1,98 
dummy_stockholm 
  1              -0,1972   0,0742 -2,66    0,009    75,49 
dummy_uppsala 
  1               0,0068   0,0141     0,48    0,630     2,73 
dummy_2001 
  1               -0,127    0,309    -0,41    0,681   625,20 
dummy_2002 
  1               -0,210    0,336    -0,62    0,534   741,19 
dummy_2003 
  1               -0,186    0,331    -0,56    0,577   720,07 
dummy_2004 
  1               -0,126   0,305    -0,41    0,679   608,57 
dummy_2005 
  1                0,133    0,167     0,80    0,429   183,19 
dummy_2006 
  1                0,089    0,179     0,50    0,619   209,63 
dummy_2007 
  1                0,071    0,170     0,41    0,679   189,81 
dummy_2008 
  1               0,1289   0,0568     2,27    0,026    21,17 
dummy_2009 
  1 0,0797   0,0677     1,18    0,242    30,04 
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